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ON THE JUSTICE OF VOTING SYSTEMS￿
JOSE APESTEGUIAy, MIGUEL A. BALLESTERz, AND ROSA FERRERx
Abstract. What are the best voting systems in terms of utilitarianism?
Or in terms of maximin, or maximax? We study these questions for the case
of three alternatives and a class of structurally equivalent voting rules. We
show that plurality, arguably the most widely used voting system, performs
very poorly in terms of remarkable ideals of justice, such as utilitarianism
or maximin, and yet is optimal in terms of maximax. Utilitarianism is best
approached by a voting system converging to the Borda count, while the
best way to achieve maximin is by means of a voting system converging
to negative voting. We study the robustness of our results across di⁄erent
social cultures, measures of performance, and population sizes.
Keywords: Voting, Scoring Rules, Utilitarianism, Maximin, Maximax,
Impartial Culture Condition.
JEL classi￿cation numbers: D00, D63, D71, D72.
1. Introduction
Should I implement a plurality voting rule if I am a convinced utilitarian?
If I wish to maximize an ideal of justice like maximin, should I implement the
Borda count? This is the type of question addressed in this paper. Our aim
is to evaluate voting systems in terms of how well they perform in relation to
some particular ideal of justice.
Many di⁄erent voting systems may be used for making group decisions in-
volving the selection of an alternative from a given set. Obvious scenarios are
the political arena, committee decisions (in ￿rms, clubs, professional associa-
tions, universities, juries), or tournaments where a winner must be selected. It
appears therefore that a proper understanding of the characteristics of voting
systems is of great importance.
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We are certainly not the ￿rst in evaluating voting systems. As long ago as
1958, Black proposed a criterion that has attracted a great deal of attention.
This criterion ranks voting systems by the probability of their selecting the
Condorcet winner. That is, in terms of the probability of their leading to the
alternative that is preferred over any other by a simple majority of voters. The
literature has followed this line of inquiry and has contrasted voting systems
on the basis of other criteria such as strategy-proofness, consistency of the
social preference ordering, Pareto-dominance, path-independence, complexity,
etc.
1
In this paper, we focus not on the speci￿c properties that voting systems
may or may not satisfy, but on how well they perform in terms of an ideal of
justice. If there is agreement over which ideal of justice is to be maximized, it
seems much more relevant to evaluate voting systems in terms of how well they
serve that ideal of justice, than for example it is to calculate the probability
of their electing the Condorcet winner. In other words, in this paper we shift
the evaluation criterion for voting systems from the ordinal to the cardinal
approach.
In our setting, agents have cardinal and interpersonally comparable utility
functions over the set of alternatives. The realization of the individual utility
values depend on the culture of the society. We start the analysis by assuming
that for every individual, the possible utility values associated to the di⁄erent
alternatives follow a uniform distribution. That is, we use a cardinal version
of the well-known impartial culture condition.
We study the class of voting systems that encompasses the set of scoring
rules that aggregate the strength or intensity of individuals￿vote for each of
three alternatives. Intensity is contingent on the position of that alternative
in the ranking given by the individual. That is, a scoring rule is de￿ned by the
values an individual may assign to the best, middle, and worst alternatives in
the reported ranking. We call such a set of scoring rules ￿xed-value scoring
rules. Notice that this class of scoring rules includes plurality voting where
one person has one vote, the Borda count, negative voting where voters name
their worst alternative, and any combination of the above. In section 4 we o⁄er
a method to ￿nd the set of all di⁄erent scoring rules when there are n agents
1Early studies are Brams and Fishburn (1978), Caplin and Nalebu⁄(1988), DeMeyer and
Plott (1970), and Nurmi (1983). For an extensive survey on the evaluation of voting rules in
terms of the probability of their electing the Condorcet winner see Gehrlein (1997). See also
Lepelley, Pierron, and Valognes (2000), Levin and Nalebu⁄ (1995), and Myerson (2002).3
and 3 alternatives.2 Throughout this paper, we will assume that individuals
honestly report their true ranking of alternatives.
We evaluate the performance of a scoring rule for a given theory of jus-
tice on the basis of the probability of its selecting the best alternative for
that theory of justice. For the case of two voters and three alternatives we
can o⁄er the mapping between any combination of maximin and maximax
(including utilitarianism) and the ranking of scoring rules. It emerges that
plurality, probably the most widely used voting system, maximizes an ideal of
justice like maximax, being the worst scoring rule in terms of utilitarianism
and maximin. That is, instead of maximizing e¢ ciency or the well-being of the
worst-o⁄agents in a society, plurality maximizes the well-being of the best-o⁄ !
Furthermore, utilitarianism is best approached by a scoring rule that falls in
between plurality and Borda, while a scoring rule between Borda and negative
is the best for maximin.
We then extend the analysis to more general social cultures, capturing dif-
ferent degrees of extremism in the evaluation of alternatives. That is, we study
a complete class of symmetric density functions de￿ned over the closed unit
interval. Later, we also explore an alternative means to measure the perfor-
mance of di⁄erent scoring rules for di⁄erent ideals of justice. In particular,
instead of focusing solely on the probability of selecting the best alternative
for a particular ideal of justice, we incorporate a method to measure the mag-
nitude of the deviations from it. The results of the analysis of these extensions
show a great deal of robustness with respect to our initial conclusions. The
main results highlighted above remain the same. We then turn to the study
of the general case of n ￿ 3. We o⁄er analytical results and insights for the
di⁄erent ideals of justice and we complete the study via a simulation model.
Remarkably, all these results for larger societies again largely reproduce the
basic results obtained in the 2￿3 case. In a nutshell, we show that plurality is
still one of the best scoring rules for maximax. In fact, we show that as n tends
to in￿nity, plurality is the best scoring rule in terms of maximax. Plurality is
easily outperformed by other scoring rules for the pursuit of either utilitarian
or maximin principles. Maximin is best approached by scoring rules that tend
towards negative voting. Finally, utilitarianism is generally best approached
by scoring rules that tend towards Borda.
There is very little work on evaluating voting systems on the basis of some
theory of justice. Notable exceptions are the early simulation studies of Bor-
dley (1983) and Merrill (1984). Bordley and Merrill analyze di⁄erent voting
2We say that two scoring rules are di⁄erent whenever there are instances in which they
di⁄er in their choice of best alternative.4
systems, including plurality and Borda, in terms of their e¢ ciency by using
simulations. Consistent with our results, they show that plurality is easily
outperformed in utilitarian terms. Our work di⁄ers from theirs, as they only
consider utilitarianism as the sole justice criterion, while we consider general
social welfare functions as ideals of justice. Furthermore, our approach is pri-
marily theoretical. Finally, the range of voting systems under scrutiny also
di⁄ers: while they study some notable procedures (such as Copeland system,
the Hare system, or approval voting), we focus on a set of structurally equiv-
alent rules, i.e., the set of all possible ￿xed-value scoring rules.
In another related strand of literature, there are papers that study how to
choose a voting rule in a constitutional setting where there are two options, the
status quo and a second alternative, and individual preferences are uncertain.
A voting rule is characterized by the number of votes needed to accept the
second alternative over the status quo. Papers in this literature study which
voting rules maximize e¢ ciency, which are self-stable, how to weight votes
in heterogenous contexts, self-enforcement voting rules, etc. In this line, see
Rae (1969), Barbera and Jackson (2004, 2006), Maggi and Morelli (2006) and
papers cited therein.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the notation and the basic de￿nitions that will be used subsequently. Section
3 contains the ￿rst theoretical analysis of the 2 ￿ 3 case. Section 4 reports
the extensions to the former analysis, and a method for ￿nding the set of all
di⁄erent scoring rules. Finally, Section 5 presents some conclusions. All the
proofs are given in the appendix.
2. Preliminaries
Let N be a ￿nite set of individuals with cardinality n and K = f1;2;3g
the set of alternatives. A society U is a matrix of n rows and 3 columns with
entries uil in [0;1], denoting cardinal and interpersonally comparable utility
values. Then, uil is the utility value for individual i with respect to alternative
l. A culture C is a probability distribution over the set of all possible societies
U = [0;1]n￿3. We start the analysis by studying cultures where for every in-
dividual, the possible utility values associated with the di⁄erent alternatives
follow the uniform distribution. That is, we start by assuming the:
3Alternatively, there are papers that study the di⁄erent properties of voting rules in the
context of the provision of a public good (see, e.g., Aghion and Bolton (2003), Harstad
(2005), and Lizzeri and Persico (2001)).5
Impartial Culture Condition (ICC): C is the uniform probability dis-
tribution over U.
Note that ICC is equivalent to considering uil as an independent uniform
realization from [0;1] for every i and l. This is a cardinal version of the well-
known and extensively studied property that states that all preference orders
are assumed equally likely.
A Social Welfare Function4 SWF is a mapping W from [0;1]n to [0;1]. That
is, let ul = (u1l;:::;unl) 2 [0;1]n, then W aggregates the individual util-
ity values in ul into a social utility. WBest(U) denotes an alternative l 2 K
that maximizes W in U = (u1;u2;u3). Prominent SWFs in the literature
of distributive justice are utilitarianism and maximin. As it is well-known,
utilitarianism takes the sum of individual utilities to evaluate an alternative.




Best(U) 2 argmaxlW Ut(ul).5 The maximin principle disregards the
utility values of the most favored individuals to evaluate an alternative on the
basis of the utility value of the worst-o⁄ agent. In other words, a SWF is
of the maximin type if W = W Min with W Min(ul) = minfu1l;:::;unlg, and
W Min
Best(U) 2 argmaxlW Min(ul). Consider also the maximax rule. Contrary to
maximin, the maximax rule focuses on the best-o⁄individuals. That is, a SWF
is of the maximax type if W = W Max with W Max(ul) = maxfu1l;:::;unlg,
and W Max
Best (U) 2 argmaxlW Max(ul). Maximax as an ideal of justice may
appear just as a formal curiosity. However, it is widely used in professional
sports to select the winner of a contest. More importantly, we will see that the
maximax principle is much more common in democratic political institutions
that one might expect.
A society U in ordinal terms UO is the collection of n complete preorders
(￿1;:::;￿n) over K which are consistent with the rows of U. That is, for any
l;h 2 K and i 2 N, l ￿i h if and only if uil ￿ uih.6 Denote by UO the set of
all possible societies in ordinal terms.
A Scoring Rule S can be represented by a vector S = (S1;S2;S3) 2 [0;1]3
denoting the strength of an individual￿ s vote for her most, middle, and least
preferred alternatives. We normalize strength of vote by assigning a value of 1
to the best reported alternative, and a value of 0 to the worst. Note that this
4Throughout the paper we use the terms ￿social welfare function￿and ￿ideal of justice￿
indistinctly.
5In the event of a tie, we assume that an alternative is chosen randomly among those
with the highest values, each with equal probability.
6Note that due to the continuity of U and the ICC, the probability of a tie in U equals
zero, and hence (￿1;:::;￿n) can be regarded as linear orders.6
normalization of the extreme values is without loss of generality. Therefore,
in this context a scoring rule is characterized by the value S 2 [0;1] assigned
to the middle alternative. Then, plurality voting is identi￿ed with S = 0, the
Borda count with S = 1=2, and negative voting with S = 1. We say that a
rule is an implosion scoring rule if S 2 (0;1=2), while if S 2 (1=2;1) it is an
explosion rule.7 We will assume that for every individual i better alternatives
in terms of ￿i are assigned more points. That is, we assume honest voting.
Now, the score of an alternative is the sum of points it is assigned across all
individuals. SBest(UO) is any alternative that has received the highest number
of points. For a given population n, two scoring rules S1 and S2 are di⁄erent
if there are instances in which they di⁄er in their choice of best alternative.
The number of di⁄erent scoring rules depends on n. Clearly, if n = 2 there are
5 di⁄erent scoring rules, since every S 2 (0;1=2) represents the same scoring
rule, and similarly, every S 2 (1=2;1) also represents the same scoring rule.
Hence, the set of di⁄erent scoring rules when n = 2 compromises plurality
(S = 0), Borda (S = 1=2), negative (S = 1), an explosion rule (with any value
S 2 (1=2;1)), and an implosion rule (with any value S 2 (0;1=2)). We analyze
the set of di⁄erent scoring rules contingent upon n in section 4.
It is our aim to contrast di⁄erent scoring rules on the basis of their per-
formance in relation to certain theories of justice. A natural index, which we
denote by I(C;W;S), measures the probability of a scoring rule S selecting
the optimal alternative for a SWF W, given a culture C, i.e.
I(C;W;S) = p(U : WBest(U) = SBest(UO))
This index has the advantage of following the same criterion to evaluate all
possible ideals of justice, and hence comparability of the success of a given
scoring rule across ideals of justice is possible. Alternative measures are con-
sidered in section 4.
3. Characterization of a Small Society: The 2 ￿ 3 Case
We begin the analysis by studying the case of two individuals and three
alternatives. Recall that in such a setting there are 5 di⁄erent classes of scoring
rules: (i) plurality voting with S = 0, (ii) Borda count with S = 1=2, (iii)
negative voting with S = 1, (iv) explosion rules with any value of S in the
interval (1=2;1), and ￿nally (v) implosion rules with any value of S in (0;1=2).
7Alternatively one could call these worst-punishing rules (best-rewarding in the case of
implosion rules) as in Cox (1990) or Myerson (2002). However, this terminology would also
include negative (respectively, plurality) and hence, we prefer to avoid it.7
Our ￿rst result provides an ordering of scoring rules contingent upon the
three ideals of justice presented in the previous section: utilitarianism, max-
imin and maximax.
Theorem 3.1. Let n = 2, k = 3, and ICC hold, then the rankings of the
scoring rules according to the index I (with values in parenthesis) are:8
￿ Utilitarianism: implosion (:743), Borda (:739), explosion (:733), negative
(:65), and plurality (:642).
￿ Maximin: explosion (:783), Borda (:739), implosion (:717), negative (:7),
and plurality (:617).
￿ Maximax: plurality (:667), implosion (:667), Borda (:639), explosion (:583),
and negative (:5).
There are several noteworthy remarks to make in relation to Theorem 3.1.
First, Theorem 3.1 gives a clear picture of how to select among scoring rules
according to a criterion of justice. If one wants to maximize utilitarianism, then
one should implement an implosion rule. If it is maximin the principle that
one wants to maximize, then an explosion rule is required. Finally, maximax
is best approached by plurality or by an implosion rule.
Second, note that plurality, probably the most widely used scoring rule,
performs optimally in terms of maximax. At the same time plurality is the
worst scoring rule both in terms of utilitarianism and maximin. That is,
instead of maximizing e¢ ciency or the well-being of the worst-o⁄ agents in a
society, plurality maximizes the well-being of the best-o⁄.
Third, note that maximin and maximax are not symmetric. In particular,
while the best scoring rules for maximax are either plurality or implosion, in
the case of maximin the only scoring rule that maximizes the consistency index
is the symmetric of implosion (i.e., explosion).
Fourth, di⁄erences in the performance of scoring across SWFs are due to the
existence of what we call type 4 and 5 societies (see the proof of Theorem 3.1).
A type 4 society is characterized by individuals agreeing on the alternative
that they regard as middle, but disagreeing on the rest (the worst alternative
for one agent is the best for the other, and viceversa).9 In a type 5 society
there is no agreement whatsoever between agents on a given position. We will
study these two types of societies in detail below.
Finally, note that in utilitarianism, whenever the utility values of the two
agents are equally weighted, implosion rules are better than Borda, and Borda
8The values shown are approximations. The exact values are reported in the Appendix.
9This class of societies has attracted a good deal of attention. Interestingly, B￿rgers and
Postl (2005) study for this class of societies whether there are incentive compatible rules
which elicit utilities and implement e¢ cient decisions.8
better than explosion rules. In maximin, however, where the only utility value
that counts is the lowest (thus the highest utility value is assigned a weight
of zero, while the lowest is assigned a weight of, say, 1), the order is reversed:
￿rst explosion, then Borda, and ￿nally implosion. This result suggests the
possibility of a continuous relation between the weighting of individual utility
values and the order of these scoring rules. That is, between the ideal of justice
and the ranking of scoring rules. To explore this and other issues, we study the
following formulation of a SWF that generalizes the three already considered.
For each alternative l, the lowest individual utility value is weighted by
￿ 2 [0;1], while the highest utility value is weighted by (1 ￿ ￿). Denote this
SWF by G(￿). Then,
G(￿;ul) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ maxfuil;ujlg + ￿ ￿ minfuil;ujlg
and GBest(￿;U) 2 argmaxlG(￿;ul). Clearly, G(1=2) corresponds to utilitar-
ianism, G(1) to maximin, and G(0) to maximax. Hence, G(￿) includes any
possible compromise between these ideals of justice. For example, one may
entertain the notion that, while neither utilitarianism, nor maximin are com-
pletely compelling, some combination of the two may be. Consequently, there
exists a value of ￿ in the (1=2;1) interval that satis￿es one￿ s aspirations of
justice.
Therefore, we can embed the three SWFs in G(￿) and study any possible
combination of them. To this end, the only types of societies we need to
analyze are types 4 and 5. It is easy to see that for every ￿ 2 [0;1] the
performance of the scoring rules in societies of types 1, 2, and 3 coincide with
that obtained when ￿ 2 f0;1=2;1g (see the proof of Theorem 3.1). For type 4
societies consider, without loss of generality, that alternative 1 is regarded as
best and worst by agents i and j, alternative 2 is regarded by both players as
the middle alternative, and hence alternative 3 is regarded as worst and best.
Now, for l 2 f1;2;3g let
rl = maxfuil;ujlg and pl = minfuil;ujlg
That is, rl denotes the utility value of the agent that values l most, while pl
denotes the utility value of the agent that values alternative l least. Then, the















10We exclude values ￿ = 0;1=2;1 since our evaluation of function (3.1) implies indeter-
minacies at these values. For more on this issue see below.9
where f(r1;r2;r3;p1;p2;p3) is the joint-density function of the continuous ran-
dom variables ui1 > ui2 > ui3 and uj1 < uj2 < uj3, and H1 and H2 are the sets
H1 = ft : t ￿ r2 + ￿
(1￿￿)(p2 ￿ p3)g and H2 = ft : t ￿ r2 + ￿
(1￿￿)(p2 ￿ p1)g.
Expression (3.1) is complex to solve. Not only does it have to identify the
best-o⁄ individuals in the three alternatives, it also has to satisfy a number
of conditional requirements. The best software packages available to us were
not able to solve it. Therefore, we solve it by decomposing it in a number of
cases. We omit the tedious details here but report them in a supplement to
this paper.11 Then, we obtain that function (3.1) is equal to:
(3.2)
5￿ + 3 ￿ ￿
2 ￿ 2 ￿ ￿
3
10
Note that when ￿ = 0;1=2;1, (3.2) is equal to 0;:3;3=5, as we obtained in the
proof of Theorem 3.1. Hence, we conclude that function (3.1) is continuous in
[0;1].
Now we turn to the case of type 5 societies. Without loss of generality, let
alternative 1 be evaluated as best and middle, alternative 2 as middle and
worst, and alternative 3 as worst and best by agents i and j respectively.
Note that for every ￿ 2 [0;1], G(￿) never selects alternative 2. Then we can
















with H = ft : t ￿ r3 + ￿
(1￿￿)(p3 ￿p1)g. As in (3.1), we had to decompose (3.3)
in a number of cases until it could be solvable by standard computer resources.
The details of the decomposition are contained in the supplement. Then, we












and, as before, we also obtain that (3.3) is a continuous function in [0;1].
We are now in a position to obtain the exact values of the consistency index
I for each of the scoring rules contingent on the value of ￿. That is, for
every possible combination of the utilitarian, maximin, and maximax SWFs,
Theorem 3.2 o⁄ers the exact consistency values obtained by each of the possible
scoring rules. Hence, for any possible SWF ￿, Theorem 3.2 gives the necessary
information to select the best scoring rule.
11The supplement is available in the webpages indicated in the opening of this paper.
12For the same reason as in function (3.1) values ￿ = 0;1=2;1 are omitted.10
Figure 1. Results of Theorem 3.2
Theorem 3.2. Let n = 2, k = 3, and ICC hold, then the values of the
consistency index I in terms of G(￿) are:
￿ Plurality: (80 ￿ 5￿ ￿ 3￿2 + 2￿3)=120,
￿ Implosion: (80 + 35￿ ￿ 39￿2 + 10￿3)=120,
￿ Borda: (115 + 60￿ ￿ 54￿2 + 12￿3)=180,
￿ Explosion: (35 + 25￿ ￿ 15￿2 + 2￿3)=60, and
￿ Negative: (30 + 25￿ ￿ 15￿2 + 2￿3)=60.
The above results can be summarized as follows. The consistency index I
in the case of plurality is decreasing in ￿, while in the cases of explosion and
negative it is increasing. For implosion and Borda the index ￿rst increases and
then decreases. Figure 1 shows the result graphically.
We end the analysis of the 2 ￿ 3 case by studying the relation between the
value of ￿ and the ranking of Borda, implosion and explosion. In other words,
the relation between the criteria of justice ￿ and the best scoring rules in
terms of G(￿). Recall that when ￿ 2 f0;1=2g, implosion rules are better than
Borda, and Borda better than explosion rules. However, when ￿ = 1 the order
is reversed: ￿rst explosion, then Borda, and ￿nally implosion. In Theorem 3.311


















that de￿nes a partition over the unit interval, o⁄ering the complete mapping
between ￿ (the social welfare function) and the best scoring rules.
Theorem 3.3. Let n = 2, k = 3, and ICC hold, then the scoring rules with
the highest consistency index in terms of G(￿) are:
￿ for ￿ = 0, plurality and implosion,
￿ for every ￿ 2 (0;x), implosion,
￿ for ￿ = x, Borda, implosion, and explosion, and
￿ for every ￿ 2 (x;1], explosion.
Theorem 3.3 shows that for values of ￿ lower than x implosion rules are
better than Borda, and Borda better than explosion rules, for values of ￿
higher than x the order is reversed, and for ￿ = x the three scoring rules
obtain exactly the same consistency index. This, together with the previous
results, allows us to give the mapping between ￿ and the best scoring rules.
4. Extensions
In this section we evaluate the robustness of the results we have obtained
so far, by exploring alternative versions of some of our previous assumptions.
In particular, (i) we check cultures other than the uniform one to explore the
e⁄ect of di⁄erent degrees of extremism, (ii) we develop an alternative index
of adequacy between ideals of justice and scoring rules, and (iii) ￿nally we
study larger societies. For the latter, we obtain the set of di⁄erent scoring
rules contingent upon n.
4.1. Alternative Probability Distributions. We now study alternative
cultures, i.e. probability distributions other than the uniform one. In par-
ticular, we study a complete class of symmetric density functions de￿ned over
the closed unit interval. This class of density functions aims to represent the
case of polarized societies, in which extreme opinions prevail, and the case
of homogenized societies with high levels of consensus. To this end, take the
parabolic function f(x) = ￿x2 + ￿x + ￿, with x 2 [0;1]. Now, in order
for f(x) to represent a symmetric density function, it must be the case that
￿ = ￿￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿), with ￿ taking values in [0;3]. Note that the ￿ = 1
case corresponds to the uniform distribution. Values of ￿ 2 [0;1) correspond
to strictly concave density functions. That is, lower values of ￿ represent
higher levels of consensus on the evaluation of an alternative. Finally, values12
of ￿ 2 (1;3] correspond to strictly convex density functions. Hence, higher
values of ￿ represent higher levels of extremism. Note, then, that a density
function in this class is characterized by its value ￿.
In order to obtain the consistency indices between the three prominent ideals
of justice (utilitarianism, maximin, and maximax) and the ￿ve di⁄erent scoring
rules in the 2￿3 case, under any density function ￿, one only has to follow the
proof of Theorem 3.1 and correct for the required joint density function. We
may conclude that very little changes. The consistency indices for maximin
and maximax do not depend on ￿, and hence coincide with those we obtained
in Theorem 3.1. Those for utilitarianism do depend on the precise value of ￿,
but for every ￿ 2 [0;3] the ranking of the scoring rules coincides with the one
obtained under the uniform distribution.
Theorem 4.1. Let n = 2, k = 3, then for every ￿ 2 [0;3] the values of the
consistency index I with respect to maximin and maximax are those obtained
in Theorem 3.1. For utilitarianism are:
￿ Plurality: (3860816￿11310￿2+5760￿3￿1715￿4+319￿5￿20￿6)=6006000,
￿ Implosion: (4454936+13710￿2￿18800￿3+4745￿4￿121￿5￿20￿6)=6006000,
￿ Borda: (664693 + 3753￿2 ￿ 3684￿3 + 969￿4 ￿ 66￿5)=900900,
￿ Explosion: (2191994+23820￿2￿18040￿3+4945￿4￿539￿5+20￿6)=3003000,
￿ Negative: (1941744+23820￿2 ￿18040￿3 +4945￿4 ￿539￿5 +20￿6)=3003000
In particular, for every ￿ 2 [0;3] the ranking of scoring rules in terms of utilitar-
ianism coincides with the one obtained in Theorem 3.1.
It is therefore important to stress that the above result gives a much greater
degree of con￿dence in the robustness of the ￿ndings obtained in the uniform
distribution.
4.2. Reconsidering the Consistency Index. Returning to the case of the
uniform distribution, we now explore new indices for measuring the adequacy
of the scoring rules to the di⁄erent ideals of justice. Recall that the consistency
index I measures the area in which a scoring rule coincides with an ideal of
justice. This index says nothing about what happens in societies outside this
area, however. In particular, it ignores the magnitude of errors, an issue on
which we will now expand. For an intuitive sense of the nature of this index,







In terms of utilitarianism the best alternative is alternative 3, with an associ-
ated social value of :6. Note that the utilitarian social value is the average13 of
the two respective individual values. Now consider a scoring rule, e.g. negative.
Negative selects alternative 2 with an associated utilitarian social value of :55.
Note that although negative does not select the utilitarian alternative, it does
not select the worst either. Notice that the worst alternative for utilitarianism
is alternative 1 with an associated utilitarian value of :5. Then the relative
distance between utilitarianism and negative is :55￿:5
:6￿:5 = 1
2, that represents the
relative loss (with respect to the worst possible performance) associated with
the choice of alternative 2 rather than the utilitarian alternative 3. This is the
kind of index addressed herein. Consider now the case of maximin. The best
alternative for maximin is alternative 2; which has an associated social value
of :5. Note that for a given alternative the maximin social value is di⁄erent
from the utilitarian social value. In the case of maximin it coincides with the
utility value of the worst-o⁄ individual. Now an analogous analysis to that of
the utilitarian case would give the relative distance between maximin and a
given scoring rule.
One of the advantages of the original consistency index I is that it allows
for comparisons between scoring rules across di⁄erent ideals of justice. As the
above example shows, this is no longer the case when considering relative mea-
sures of distance, since now the measure of performance now changes with each
ideal of justice. Hence, comparability across ideals of justice is meaningless.
However, if one is clear about the ideal of justice that should be implemented,
then this new index may hold some attraction. We now turn to the formal
de￿nitions.
Recall that GBest(￿;U) is the best alternative in society U in terms of the
ideal of justice ￿. Then G(￿;uGBest(￿;U)) is the maximum social utility ac-
cording to the ideal of justice ￿ in a society U. Also recall that SBest(UO)
denotes the best alternative in society U according to the scoring rule S.
Then the associated social utility value of this alternative in terms of ￿ is
G(￿;uSBest(UO)). Thus, we are concerned here with the relative distance be-
tween G(￿;uGBest(￿;U)) and G(￿;uSBest(UO)) across all possible societies. To
this end consider the worst possible election in a society U, GWorst(￿;U) 2







13Utilitarianism may also be expressed with the sum of utilities of both agents, without
any e⁄ect on the results.14
over all possible societies. That is, we compute the integral of (4.1) with
respect to the culture distribution. We denote this index as E(C;W;S).
In what follows, we focus on the uniform distribution and the cases of ￿ 2
f0;1=2;1g.
Theorem 4.2. Let n = 2, k = 3, and ICC hold, then the rankings of the
scoring rules according to the index E (with values in parenthesis) are14:
￿ Utilitarianism: implosion (:917), Borda (:917), explosion (:917), negative
(:857), and plurality (:857).
￿ Maximin: explosion (:914), Borda (:878), implosion (:860), negative (:857),
and plurality (:768).
￿ Maximax: implosion (:869), plurality (:857), Borda (:851), explosion (:815),
and negative (:768).
There is a great deal of consistency between the results here and those
obtained in Theorem 3.1. Notice that with respect to utilitarianism, implosion
and explosion ￿and hence Borda￿ obtain the same value for E. Recall now
that implosion was outperforming explosion when using the index I, i.e. when
measuring the probability of choosing the best alternative. In other words,
implosion selects the utilitarian alternative more often than explosion does.
Then, since the two perform equally in terms of E, it must be the case that,
when not selecting the best alternative, the loss of implosion is greater than
the loss of explosion. With respect to maximin, nothing relevant changes. For
maximax note that implosion is now the best scoring rule.
4.3. Classes of Scoring Rules in n-agent Societies. We start the analysis
of the case of 3 alternatives and n individuals by studying the set of di⁄erent
scoring rules. Recall that we say that two scoring rules are di⁄erent whenever
there are pro￿les of societies (with positive measure) in which they result in
di⁄erent choices with respect to the best alternative.








where Bl represents the number of people voting for alternative l as the best
one, Ml represents the number of people voting for alternative l as the middle
one, l 2 f1;2g, and N denotes the set of non-negative integers. It is straight-
forward to see that from this pair of vectors we can compute the number of
people voting for any alternative l 2 f1;2;3g as best, middle, or worst.
14The values shown are approximations. The exact values are reported in the Appendix.15
Recall that in the present context a scoring rule is characterized by the value
S 2 [0;1] assigned to the middle alternative. Then, we ￿rst ￿nd those scoring
rules S for which there exists a pro￿le of preferences where:
￿ at least two alternatives (w.l.o.g, alternatives 1 and 2) are selected, and
￿ B1 > B2 (and consequently M1 < M2).
That is, alternatives 1 and 2 tie as top elements and this is not due to the fact
that they have the same number of votes as the best and middle alternatives.
The ordering B1 > B2 is without loss of generality. The following system of
inequalities makes these two conditions compatible with all the restrictions on
positivity we have to incorporate:
(4.2)
B1 + S ￿ M1 = B2 + S ￿ M2 ￿ (n ￿ B1 ￿ B2) + S(n ￿ M1 ￿ M2)
B1 > B2;M1 < M2
B1 + M1 ￿ n;B2 + M2 ￿ n
B1 + B2 ￿ n;M1 + M2 ￿ n
B1 + B2 + M1 + M2 ￿ n
Denote the set of solutions of such a system,15 plus values 0 and 1 as set E(n),
and consider that E(n) = fe0;e1;:::;eQ(n)g, with e0 = 0 and eQ(n) = 1, is
ordered by the natural order relation < on the rational numbers. For each
pair eq;eq+1 of consecutive values in E(n), q 2 f0;:::;Q(n) ￿ 1g, let aq+1 be
any real number in (eq;eq+1): Denote by A(n) = fa1;:::;aQ(n)g the collection
of all such values.
Proposition 4.3. The set of di⁄erent scoring rules with n agents and 3 al-
ternatives is E(n) [ A(n). Hence, the number of di⁄erent scoring rules is
2jE(n)j ￿ 1.
Clearly, by construction, every eq 2 E(n) represents a particular scoring
rule, di⁄erent from all others. Furthermore, as shown in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.3, every two values S1 and S2 in (eq;eq+1), q 2 f0;:::;Q(n) ￿ 1g, rep-
resent the same scoring rule, that is a di⁄erent scoring rule to any other eq 2
E(n), and also di⁄erent from any other S in (eq0;eq0+1), q0 2 f0;:::;Q(n)￿1g,
with q 6= q0. As a result, the set of di⁄erent scoring rules with n agents and 3
alternatives can be described as the solutions E(n) plus any value in between
two of these scoring rules. This makes a total number of 2jE(n)j ￿ 1 di⁄erent
scoring rules.
15We have programmed a Mathematica code that provides the set of solutions S 2 (0;1)
to the system of inequalities (4.2). The code is available in the webpages above mentioned.16
4.4. Insights on Larger Societies. We can o⁄er a result on the best scoring
rules that maximize the consistency index I for the maximax SWF. To this end,
recall that e1 denotes the minimum value of E(n)nf0g. Note that in the 2￿3
case, both plurality and the scoring rule with value in (0;e1) were the best for
maximax. Proposition 4.4 shows that this result is robust to larger societies.
Moreover, Proposition 4.4 shows that when n tends to in￿nity, plurality is the
best scoring rule in terms of maximax.
Proposition 4.4. In societies with n voters and 3 alternatives, plurality and
the scoring rule with value in (0;e1) perform the best among the set of all
scoring rules in terms of maximax. Moreover, when n tends to in￿nity, e1
tends to zero.
From the proof of Proposition 4.4, it is clear that these results are valid for
any possible culture, provided that the utility realizations are i.i.d.
In the 2 ￿ 3 maximin case, the best scoring rule turns out to be explosion,
i.e., the one with the scoring value immediately below negative. Moreover,
negative is strictly dominated by explosion. We now show that the latter
result holds for any value of n. We also show that for larger societies, the
optimal scoring rule in terms of maximin is never the interval of scoring rules
immediately below negative.
Proposition 4.5. For any n, negative is not the best scoring rule for maximin.
Moreover, if n ￿ 7, then the optimal scoring rule for maximin SMIN is below
(n ￿ 1)=n.
The intuition behind the above result goes as follows. Consider a single
realization u that is known to be the lowest utility value of an individual.
Also, take a group of n realizations known to be middle utility values of n
individuals. If n is small, the lowest realization in this group is likely to be
above u. This is in fact the case in Theorem 3.1, for type 4 societies. However,
as n increases, there is a competitive e⁄ect among the middle alternatives that
takes the lowest of such realizations to be below u. We conjecture, however,
that this competitive e⁄ect is reduced signi￿cantly if one adds additional worst
realizations to both sides of the above argument. In fact, the simulations below
unambiguously indicate this to be the case, making the optimal set of scoring
rules converge to negative.
In the 2￿3 utilitarian case, we observe that the sum of two middle realiza-
tions is close to the sum of a worst and a best realization (:35 and :3 in terms
of the consistency index I), that nevertheless do not coincide. This is due
to the dependence relation between the ordered utility values of the agents.
We conjecture that as n increases, the dependence relations that explain this17
small deviation cancel out, making Borda the optimal scoring rule in the limit.
Although we do not have a proof for this, the simulations below suggest that
this is the case.
4.5. Simulations. In this section we construct a simulation model to study
larger societies. Speci￿cally, we analyze for n = 2;3;:::;10 and 100 the perfor-
mance of all di⁄erent scoring rules (see section 4.3) in terms of the three most
prominent ideals of justice: utilitarianism, maximin, and maximax, under the
ICC.
We proceed as follows. First, we obtain m di⁄erent societies, for each of
which we compare the alternatives selected by the three SWFs with those
selected by each of the scoring rules. For a SWF W and a scoring rule S, we
de￿ne ~ xS as the random variable representing the number of times, out of the
m pro￿les, that the scoring rule succeeds in selecting the alternative chosen by
the SWF. We estimate I(C;W;S) by constructing a con￿dence interval around
the sample consistency index ~ IS =
~ xS
m :
Notice that ~ xS follows a binomial distribution with parameters m (number
of trials) and I (probability of success of a single trial). Hence, its expectation
is given by E[~ xS] = m￿I and its variance is given by V [~ xS] = m￿I(1￿I). For
m large enough, we approximate the binomial distribution by using a normal
distribution with the same expectation and variance. Then, the length of the





Now, the greatest possible value for I(1 ￿ I) is :25; which is reached when
I = :5. Since the true value of I is unknown, taking the most conservative
estimate, we consider the length of the interval as if I(1￿I) = :25. We adopt a
level of con￿dence of 95%, and an interval of length :001. Then, from (4.3) we
obtain that m = 3;841;600. Hence, we simulate almost four million societies.
4.5.1. Results of the simulation model. We say that a scoring rule is optimal
in terms of an ideal of justice if it cannot be statistically rejected that its
consistency index is among the highest. Figure 2 reports the corresponding
intervals of optimal scoring rules for the cases of utilitarianism and maximin,
by providing the lower and upper values of S in that interval. Further, for
each case Figure 2 also reports the scoring rule with the highest consistency
index. We refer to the latter by the best scoring rules. Let us highlight the
following results.18






















































Figure 2. Results of the simulations for Utilitarianism and Maximin
First, note that for every n under consideration, the range of optimal scoring
rules for maximin is in the set of explosion rules, while for utilitarianism it is
generally (except for n = 3) in the range of implosion rules.16
16Having characterized the maximax case in Proposition 4.4, we omit the corresponding
simulation results. It is su¢ cient to mention here that they are fully in line with what was
theoretically obtained. We can provide the results upon request.19
Second, as the size of the society increases, the set of optimal scoring rules
for utilitarianism converges to an implosion rule close to Borda (S = 1=2). In
terms of maximin, the set of optimal scoring rules converges to a high value
explosion rule, close to negative. However, negative (S = 1) does not belong
to the set of optimal scoring rules in terms of maximin. This is in concordance
with what was obtained in Proposition 4.4.
We may conclude from the above that the theoretical picture obtained for
the 2 ￿ 3 case is closely mirrored in larger societies.
We now turn our attention to the values of the consistency index both for
the best scoring rules and for plurality, Borda, and negative. Figure 3 reports
these values. It can be immediately perceived that while the value of the
consistency index of the best scoring rules is fairly stable around the level
of 75% in terms of utilitarianism, it decreases considerably in terms of the
maximin principle. That is, as n increases, the probability that the optimal
scoring rules will select the utilitarian alternative is broadly stable, while it
becomes harder and harder for them to select the maximin alternative (the
maximax case is analogous to maximin). This may plausibly be due to the
symmetry found in utilitarianism. It is the only SWF among those studied
here that weights equally the utilities of both individuals, irrespective of their
social position (worst-o⁄ or best-o⁄). In the case of maximin (and maximax)
the utility of only one of these individuals is considered. However, any scoring
rule assigns the same weight to all individuals thus making such discrimination
impossible.
Second, Figure 3 shows that the di⁄erences between the best utilitarian scor-
ing rule and the Borda count, and the best maximin scoring rule and negative
are very small. However, as noted earlier, these di⁄erences are statistically
signi￿cant.
Finally, the ￿gure con￿rms the impression gained in the analysis of the 2￿3
case regarding the poor performance of plurality in terms of utilitarianism and
maximin.
5. Conclusions
This paper explores the relation between ideals of justice and voting systems.
Whereas ideals of justice are typically presented in cardinal terms, the theory
of voting systems is primarily constructed on the basis of ordinal information.
We explore the cardinal consequences of using ordinal-based scoring rules.
We have investigated how the ordinal-cardinal relation evolves when di⁄er-
ent criteria of distributive justice are considered. We have shown that the
optimal choice of scoring rule depends on the criterion of justice that one20




































































Figure 3. Performance of the main scoring rules21
wishes to follow. Among our speci￿c ￿ndings we emphasize that our results
reinforce the natural link between utilitarianism and the Borda count (more
speci￿cally, between utilitarianism and a set of scoring rules converging to the
Borda count). Also highlighted herein is the poor performance of plurality
voting in terms of utilitarianism and maximin, as opposed to maximax where
it performs optimally. Finally, we note that negative voting best approaches
maximin.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We organize the proof by types of societies in ordinal
terms UO. The analysis of the ￿rst three types of societies is independent of
the SWF under consideration.
Type 1: Perfect correlation. This is the case when ￿1=￿2. It is easy to
see that this type has a measure of 1/6. The three SWFs always select the
alternative regarded as the best element by both individuals, as any scoring
rule except for negative voting. Negative randomizes between the best and
the middle alternatives with equal probability. Therefore, for type 1 societies
there is perfect consistency between the three SWFs and all scoring rules
except negative voting. In the latter there is a consistency of 1=2.
Type 2: Only best-correlation. Both individuals agree on the best alterna-
tive, but disagree on the others (measure 1/6). All scoring rules coincide with
the three SWFs in selecting the best alternative.
Type 3: Only worst-correlation. Both individuals coincide in the worst
alternative, but disagree on the others (measure 1/6). All scoring rules attach
equal selection probabilities to the non-worst alternatives. By the impartial
culture condition, ICC, it is straightforward to see that in one half of the
societies any of the three SWFs selects one of these non-worst alternatives,
while in the other half the other non-worst alternative. Hence, all scoring
rules will coincide with any of the three SWFs one half of the time.
Now we turn to analyze the case of type 4 and type 5 societies independently,
for each of the three SWFs.
(i) Utilitarianism:
Type 4: Only middle-correlation. Both individuals agree on the middle
alternative, but disagree on the others (measure 1/6). For every possible soci-
ety: (i) plurality and implosion will randomize with equal probability between
the non-middle alternatives, (2) Borda will randomize with probability 1/3
between the three alternatives, and (3) negative and explosion will select the
middle alternative.22
To compute the selection of utilitarianism we ￿st need to derive the joint
probability distribution associated to the continuous random variables Besti,
Middlei and Worsti, with 1 ￿ Besti ￿ Middlei ￿ Worsti ￿ 0, for a given
individual i:
F(bi;mi;wi) = P(Besti ￿ bi;Middlei ￿ mi;Worsti ￿ wi) =
P(ui1 ￿ wi;ui2 ￿ wi;ui3 ￿ wi) +
3P(wi ￿ ui1 ￿ mi;ui2 ￿ wi;ui3 ￿ wi) +
3P(wi ￿ ui1 ￿ mi;wi ￿ ui2 ￿ mi;ui3 ￿ wi) +
6P(mi ￿ ui1 ￿ bi;wi ￿ ui2 ￿ mi;ui3 ￿ wi) =
w
3
i + 3(mi ￿ wi)w
2
i + 3(mi ￿ wi)
2wi + 6(bi ￿ mi)(mi ￿ wi)wi
The joint probability density function is
f(bi;mi;wi) =
￿
6 if 1 ￿ bi ￿ mi ￿ wi ￿ 0
0 otherwise
Hence, the density function for the two agents is
f(bi;mi;wi;bj;mj;wj) =
￿
36 if 1 ￿ bi ￿ mi ￿ wi ￿ 0, and 1 ￿ bj ￿ mj ￿ wj ￿ 0
0 otherwise
We can now calculate the probability of utilitarianism choosing the middle
alternative. The middle alternative will be the winner of utilitarianism, when-















where Ha and Hb are the sets Ha = ft : t ￿ mi + mj ￿ wig and Hb = ft : t ￿
























(mj ￿ wj)(mi ￿ wi)dmi+
17Some of the integrals are developed throughout the proof, especially in the ￿rst steps.


































Clearly, utilitarianism chooses either of the two non-middle alternatives with
equal probability, which, given the above result, has a value of :35. Then,
plurality and implosion select the utilitarian selection with probability :35,
Borda with probability 1=3, and explosion and negative with :3.
Type 5. No correlation. Individuals do not agree in the position of any
alternative (measure 1=3). Note that then there exists an alternative (without
loss of generality denoted by 1) that is evaluated by individuals i and j as best
and middle, and another alternative (w.l.o.g. denoted by 2) evaluated as mid-
dle and worst. Hence, alternative 1 dominates alternative 2, and consequently
utilitarianism will never select alternative 2. Note then that alternative 3 is
evaluated as worst and best by individuals i and j. Then, the probability of

















































Then, alternative 1 is selected by utilitarianism with probability 4=5. Thus,
all scoring rules, except plurality, select the utilitarian winner with probability
4=5, and plurality with probability 1=2.
Table 1 summarizes the results with regard to utilitarianism, which com-
Table 1. Consistency Indexes for Utilitarianism
Measure Plurality Implosion Borda Explosion Negative
Type 1 1/6 1 1 1 1 1/2
Type 2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1
Type 3 1/6 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Type 4 1/6 .35 .35 1/3 .3 .3
Type 5 1/3 1/2 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5
Index .642 .742 .739 .733 .65
pletes the proof of the ￿rst part of Theorem 3.1.
(ii) Maximin:
Type 4: Only middle-correlation. Let us calculate the probability of max-
imin choosing one of the non-middle alternatives. This will be the case when
the middle value for player i is lower than the worst value for player j, i 6= j.
Then, the probability of maximin selecting one of the non-middle alternatives















where Hd is the set Hd = ft : t ￿ mig and R denotes the reals.18 The
previous probability is equal to 1=5. By symmetry, the probability of maximin
choosing the other non-middle alternative is also 1=5, and hence the probability
of choosing the middle alternative is 3=5.
Hence, plurality and implosion select the maximin selection with probability
1=5, Borda with probability 1=3, and explosion and negative with 3=5.
Type 5. No correlation. Taking the same notation as for the case of utilitari-
anism, the same argument as above (equation (A.5)) shows that the probability
of maximin selecting alternative 3 is 1=5, and consequently the probability of
selecting alternative 1 is 4=5.














Therefore, all the rules except plurality select the maximin option with
probability 4=5, and plurality selects it with probability 1=2.
Table 2 summarizes the results for maximin. Then, the proof of the second
Table 2. Consistency Indexes for Maximin
Measure Plurality Implosion Borda Explosion Negative
Type 1 1/6 1 1 1 1 1/2
Type 2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1
Type 3 1/6 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Type 4 1/6 1/5 1/5 1/3 3/5 3/5
Type 5 1/3 1/2 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5
Index .617 .717 .739 .783 .7
part of Theorem 3.1 is now complete.
(iii) Maximax: In type 4 societies (middle correlation), the maximax prin-
ciple never selects the alternative evaluated as middle by the agents. Then,
by symmetry, maximax randomizes with equal probabilities between the two
non-middle alternatives.
In type 5 societies (no correlation), it is easy to see that maximax never
selects the alternative that is evaluated as middle and worst by agents i and j,
respectively. Then, the non-dominated alternatives for maximax are alterna-
tive 1; which is evaluated as best by i and middle by j, and alternative 3, which
is evaluated as worst by i and best by j. Note that it cannot simultaneously
hold that (i)j0s middle option is placed higher than i0s best option, and (ii) i0s
worst option is placed higher than j0s best option. Then, alternative 1 will be
the selected alternative by maximax whenever the best of i is above the best
of j, and vice versa. Finally, since i0s and j0s best options are independent
continuous random variables, maximax randomizes with equal probabilities
between alternatives 1 and 3.
Table 3 concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof of Theorem 3.2 follows from the proof of
Theorem 3.1, the analysis of type 4 and type 5 societies performed in section
3, and the resolution of integrals (3.2) and (3.4) contained in the supplement
to this paper.￿
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Note that for every ￿ 2 [0;1] the values of the
consistency index of implosion, Borda, and explosion coincide in all types of
societies except type 4, where, for every ￿ 2 [0;1] Borda obtains a consistency26
Table 3. Consistency Indexes for Maximax
Measure Plurality Implosion Borda Explosion Negative
Type 1 1/6 1 1 1 1 1/2
Type 2 1/6 1 1 1 1 1
Type 3 1/6 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Type 4 1/6 1/2 1/2 1/3 0 0
Type 5 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Index .667 .667 .639 .583 .5
index of 1=3. This is the case because Borda gives the same score to the 3
alternatives. However, the values of the consistency index of explosion and
implosion depend on ￿. Now, we have shown that (3.1) is a monotone and
continuous function, and hence there must exist at least one intersection point
with 1=3. To obtain this intersection we have to ￿nd the roots of the cubic
function
(A.6)
5￿ + 3 ￿ ￿






In order to avoid complex numbers we use Chebyshev cube roots instead of
ordinary cube roots. Then, we ￿rst make a simple transformation of (A.6) to
get a representation of the form ￿
3 + a￿













We now reduce (A.7) to the depressed form by substituting ￿ = g￿ a































r3 = ￿r1 ￿ r2;
where t = (a2 ￿ 3b)=9 and q = ￿(2a3 ￿ 9ab + 27c)=27. The only solution in
the unit interval is r3. Therefore, the intersection of (3.2) with 1=3 of interest27
to us is:





















Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let g(v) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)v2 + (1 ￿ ￿)v + ￿, with v 2







if 1 ￿ bi ￿ mi ￿ wi ￿ 0, and 1 ￿ bj ￿ mj ￿ wj ￿ 0
0 otherwise
The proof follows by reproducing the proof of Theorem 3.1 with the ￿-joint
density function.￿
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof follows the spirit of of Theorem 3.1 by
again dividing all possible societies into the same ￿ve types. To convey the
main intuition, we report here only the integrals for the case of maximin in
type 5 societies with regard to negative, and leave the remaining cases to the
supplement of this paper.
In type 5 societies, negative selects alternative 1 (bi and mj). The social




























where He and Hf are the sets He = ft : t ￿ big and Hf = ft : t ￿ big. Notice
that sets He and Hf establish conditions for bi and mj to be the maximin


















































35 for types 1 to 4, respectively. Weighting
these with the corresponding probability measures, negative obtains a social
maximin value of 17
35.
Independently of the type of society, the maximin value of the worst alterna-
tive is the lowest utility value among all realizations. Clearly this corresponds

















where Hg = ft : t ￿ wig.
To obtain the social value of the best alternative for maximin in type 5
societies, ￿rst note that alternative 2 is dominated. The social value can be
























































with Hh = ft : t ￿ big, Hi = ft : wi ￿ t ￿ big, Hj = ft : mj ￿ t ￿ bjg,
Hk = ft : t ￿ bjg. The calculus of these integrals leads to a value of 69
140.
Weighting this value and those corresponding to the remaining types of soci-
eties, one can see that the election of the best maximin alternative obtains a
value of 19









Proof of Proposition 4.3. That elements in E(n) de￿ne di⁄erent scoring
rules is obvious from the de￿nition of E(n). We now claim that, for any two
scoring rules Ss and St with eq < Ss < St < eq+1, q 2 f0;:::;Q(n) ￿ 1g, both
scoring rules are equivalent.
Suppose this is not true. In this case, there exists a pro￿le of preferences
in UO such that the scoring rule associated to Ss selects, w.l.o.g., alternative
1 whereas 2 is among those selected by St (where either 1 is not selected by
St or 2 is not selected by Ss. We assume w.l.o.g. that 1 is not selected by
St ). Then B1 + SsM1 ￿ B2 + SsM2 (with B1 + SsM1 ￿ B3 + SsM3) and29
B1 + StM1 < B2 + StM2 (with B3 + StM3 ￿ B2 + StM2). Equivalently,
(B1￿B2) ￿ Ss(M1￿M2) and (B1￿B2) < St(M1￿M2). Since (B1￿B2) <
St(M1 ￿ M2), it must be either B1 6= B2 or M1 6= M2. Thus, if (B1 ￿ B2) =
Ss(M1 ￿ M2), it should be Ss in E(n), which is absurd. Therefore, it must
be (B1 ￿ B2) > Ss(M1 ￿ M2). Thus, there exists a value Sg in the interval
(Ss;St) such that (B1 ￿ B2) = Sg(M1 ￿ M2) which leads to Sg 2 E(n) again
contradicting the construction of set E(n).
Moreover, if S 2 (eq;eq+1), it is clear that no ties (with di⁄erent values
Bl;Ml) can appear for the associated scoring rule, thus making it di⁄erent
from any scoring rule in E(n).19 As a result, the set of scoring rules with n
agents can be described as the solutions E(n) plus any value in between two
of these scoring rules.￿
Proof of Proposition 4.4. First note that only alternatives regarded as best
by some agents can be selected by maximax. In fact, due to the i.i.d. nature of
utility realizations across individuals, those alternatives that the larger number
of agents regard as best are the ones with the highest probability of being the
maximax alternative. It is immediate that plurality selects precisely this type
of alternatives (those with the larger number of votes) as best. Now, consider e1
as de￿ned above, and take any scoring rule S with S ￿ e1. By construction, it
is clear that there exists a pro￿le of preferences in UO for which the alternative
with the larger number of votes as best alternative is displaced by (or selected
in combination with) a di⁄erent one with a strictly smaller number of votes.
By our previous reasoning, the choice made by such a scoring rule leads to a
lower consistency index than plurality.
To study the second part of the Proposition, we prove that for any m in
the natural numbers, there exists a society for which all scoring rules with
S ￿ 1
m are worse than plurality in terms of maximax. Consider a society with
dimension n = 2m + 1 and let B = (m + 1;m);M = (0;m). Note that, for
any scoring rule, the third alternative is strictly dominated by alternative 2:
Any scoring rule with S ￿ 1
m considers alternative 2 among the set of selected
alternatives, thus underperforming plurality. Hence, the set of best scoring
rules in terms of maximax when n = 2m + 1 is contained in the set of scoring
rules with value in [0; 1
m).￿
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Recall that eQ(n)￿2 and eQ(n)￿1 denote the two
largest values that solve the system 4.2, that correspond to (n ￿ 2)=(n ￿ 1)
and (n ￿ 1)=n, respectively. Now consider the following two types of ordinal
societies: (1) society-1 (perfect correlation): this is the case when ￿i=￿j for
19It is straightforward to see that they are di⁄erent from the extremes 0 and 1.30
every i;j ￿ n; and (2) society-2: all individuals except one have the same
ordering, while the other individual has the reverse ordering. W.l.o.g., let the
individual with a di⁄erent ordering be individual n, and to avoid confusion
with future developments, denote this individual by the symbol ￿.
We show that among the four following scoring rules, Sa 2 ((n ￿ 2)=(n ￿
1);(n ￿ 1)=n), Sb = (n ￿ 1)=n, Sc 2 ((n ￿ 1)=n;1), and Sd = 1, Sa dominates
the other scoring rules in the sense of the consistency index I. First note
that the four scoring rules select the same alternative in all ordinal societies,
except in the two above. Thus, they have the same probability of choosing the
maximin winner in every society, except for the two above.
Consider society-1 (perfect correlation). Clearly, Sa;Sb and Sc always select
the alternative regarded as best by all agents, while Sd randomizes between
this alternative and the one regarded as the middle option by all agents. Hence,
since this society has a positive measure (1=6n) and maximin always selects
the alternative regarded as best by all agents, Sd is dominated for this type of
ordinal societies.
Now consider society-2. Denote by 1 the alternative that is regarded by all
agents as the middle option, by 2 the alternative regarded by all individuals,
except ￿, as best, the remaining alternative is denoted by 3. We compute
the probability of maximin selecting alternative 2. The condition for 2 not
being the maximin winner is u￿2 ￿ ui1, i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1. Note that u￿2 = w￿
and ui1 = mi, i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1. The density function of the worst variable
is 3(1 ￿ w￿)2 and the density function of a middle variable is 6mi(1 ￿ mi):





w￿ ￿￿￿n￿1 times ￿￿￿
R 1
w￿ 3(1 ￿ w￿)2
n￿1 Y
i=1
6mi(1 ￿ mi)dmn￿1 ￿￿￿dm1dw￿:
This is equivalent to ￿2 =
R 1
0 3(1 ￿ w￿)2[1 ￿ (w￿)2(3 ￿ 2w￿)]n￿1dw￿:
We now calculate the probability of maximin choosing the third alternative,












0 6m￿(1 ￿ m￿)3n￿2
When n = 6, (￿1;￿2;￿3) = (46
91; 2204
4641; 1
51), and thus ￿1 > ￿2 > ￿3. However,
when n = 7, (￿1;￿2;￿3) = (21627
45220; 22947
45220; 1
70), hence ￿2 > ￿1 > ￿3. Therefore, for
this type of societies, when n = 7 the maximin winner is more likely to be
alternative 2. Scoring rule Sa also selects alternative 2, while Sb randomizes
with equal probabilities between alternatives 1 and 2, and Sc and Sd select31
alternative 1. Hence, since this society has a positive measure (n=6n), Sa
dominates the other scoring rules for this type of ordinal societies.
Considering the analysis of both types of societies and taking into account
that Sa,Sb,Sc and Sd always select the same alternative in any other type of
society, it is clear that Sa has the largest index among this group of scoring
rules for n = 7.
To conclude the proof of the proposition, it is su¢ cient to note that ￿2 is
increasing with respect to n. To see this, recall that the condition for 2 not
being the maximin winner is u￿2 ￿ ui1, i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1. Clearly, from the
independence generation of utilities across individuals, the larger n the stricter
the condition and thus, the probability of alternative 2 not being selected is
smaller. This proves that ￿2 is increasing with respect to n and since this
probability is strictly larger than 1
2 when n = 7, for any n ￿ 7, it is ￿2 > 1
2 > ￿1,
making Sa the best scoring rule among the four considered.￿
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